1 More radically, the question might be rejected on the ground that ownership is a concept that must be challenged as part of a more general challenge to doctrinalism. With those who think that legal study has "got past" doctrinalism, dialogue is hardly possible. 2 Many sticks may in fact be held by third parties, so that the seller has only a depleted bundle. 3 This view was held by others too. Thus J M Halliday, an authority on conveyancing, wrote that "the process of infeftment made no change in ownership: it merely transformed an existing personal right into a real right." ("The tragedy of sasine" 1965 JR 105 at 114.) The sentence, though in the past tense, was equally about the contemporary law.
Vol 8 2004 the edinburgh law review was puzzled. If these two statements were both true it would follow, with the force of a proof in Euclid, that ownership is not a real right. Since ownership is axiomatically a real right, at least one of the premises had to be false. Fellow students did not seem to share my concern: no doubt few of them expected conveyancing to make sense anyway. I pressed the Professor, but received no satisfactory answer. I researched the point. The answer was clear. Ownership passes on registration. There were, indeed, some dicta saying that "as between" the parties the property passed on delivery of the disposition, but it was evident to me even at that stage of my studies that such a notion is devoid of meaning. A right that has effect merely "as between the parties" is definitionally a personal right. 4 Since a disponer remains owner until registration of the disposition, the property remains, until then, subject to the rights of his or her creditors. The only way to escape that conclusion would be if the disponer held the property in trust. But in that argument there seemed little mileage.
The matter thus appeared clear. Remarks, judicial or academic, suggesting that ownership passes before registration, or, more radically, that Scots law does not have a unitary idea of ownership, were, I had no doubt, inadvertencies. 9 It was held that the liquidator, not the buyer, took the property. 10 The decision had just come out when I was studying, and had made a stir. Many had been surprised by it.
In retrospect Gibson was perhaps the case that saved property law. 11 One suspects that it could have gone the other way. Had it done so, equity would have been established, and the language of real rights would have faded gradually away, and become quaint, like, say, "teinds" analysis Vol 8 2004 and "thirlage". Such a decision would probably not have been challenged: by contrast, if the House of Lords in Burnett's Trustee had decided in favour of the buyers there would have been considerable pressure for the Scottish Parliament to intervene. But whilst Gibson discredited the "ownership by contract" theory, it gave a boost to the "ownership by delivery" theory. Property law had survived one crisis but now had to experience a second one.
In Sharp a company granted a floating charge to a bank. This was duly registered. The company then sold the property, and was paid, and delivered a disposition. The buyers held the disposition but did not register it until more than a year later.
12 By that time the bank had enforced the charge by means of receivership. If the floating charge had been an ordinary security then obviously the bank would have prevailed, whether the buyers had registered or not. But the floating charge is an exotic animal. When an asset is alienated, the charge ceases to cover it. So the question was whether, at the moment of enforcement, the asset still belonged to the selling company. In the Outer House it was held that it did. The Inner House adhered unanimously. The quality of the opinions was very high. The House of Lords reversed. On what grounds? "What is the ratio of Sharp v Thomson?" became a favourite examination question. It was as unanswerable as a Zen koan, but, unlike a koan, there was no bliss of enlightenment.
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Burnett's Trustee was a less complicated case because it did not involve the psychedelic obscurities of the floating charge. Mrs Burnett sold a house. She was paid the price. The disposition was delivered to the buyers, Mr and Mrs Grainger. They took possession. Thus far the facts were much the same as in Sharp. Again, as in Sharp, the buyers did not seek to register for more than a year. By the time they did so, they found that the seller had been sequestrated and that the trustee in sequestration had been registered as owner. The trustee raised an action to obtain possession of the property. The Sheriff Principal found in favour of the buyers, on the basis of Sharp. The trustee appealed successfully to the Inner House. The buyers appealed to the House of Lords, which unanimously adhered.
Was the decision right? Of course. The uncertainty was less what the law was than whether the House of Lords would apply it. Final courts of appeal are subject to little restraint save selfrestraint.
14 With courts, as with the soul, self-restraint is a weak force. The temptation is to seek to improve the law without the slow, tiresome and unpredictable business of legislation: it is at this point that the familiar and appropriate phenomena of purposive statutory construction and of the general creative development of the common law pass over into full-blooded judicial legislation, in which the law is unambiguously and nakedly altered. I cannot share that equanimity with which most academic lawyers regard judicial legislation. Even if it were constitutionally acceptable, a danger is that it will be done badly. A court looking at single case, and hearing the views of just two sets of lawyers, may not necessarily be in the best position to frame new laws, just and workable. Nowhere is this more true than in the law of property. In the law of obligations, judicial decision is often a good vehicle for legal development, because obligations normally affect only the immediate parties, so that those affected are heard. But many other areas of law, and especially the law of property, are characterised by third-party effect, and in such areas judicial decision is evidently a most unsafe means of legal development.
In Burnett's Trustee an able and distinguished English judge, now departed from this life, said: "What does surprise me is that Scotland, now a highly developed economy, should have a Vol 8 2004 the edinburgh law review land law which is still based on the judicial development, albeit sophisticated, of the laws of Rome…"
15 Those who hope for a warm, touchy-feely, convergence of European private law might like to think about what conceptions of the Civilian tradition must have existed for that remark to have been first thought and then uttered, ideas which, as everyday experience confirms, are not confined to the eminent judge in question, even if they are seldom so honestly avowed. "What is 'diligence'?" is the question with which one of the English judges is said to have interrupted senior counsel for the respondents. 16 To lack knowledge of the elements, and at the same time to be expected to play the part of the supreme expert: this cannot be a happy experience.
17 Such remarks, and such questions, may raise doubts as to the appropriateness of appeals to the House of Lords, or whatever court may replace it, in cases where there is significant divergence from English law.
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The decision was unanimous, the bench consisting, as is usual, of five judges. We do not know how easily the result might have been other than it was. 19 We do know that at least two of the English judges disliked the result, and one wonders whether some firmness may have been needed on the part of the Scottish judges: if so, they deserve credit for it. But things cannot be right if such firmness is necessary.
The unanimity and the overall approach may be linked. The overall approach is a narrow one. This is a leading case on property law, and yet surprisingly little is said of that law. Although Sharp prompted an avalanche of academic debate, some of it of the highest quality, that debate is passed over in silence. 20 The strategy of counsel for the respondent seems to have been to keep the case a narrow one, to show their Lordships that they were bound hand and foot by precedent, by rules which, being built into the fabric of insolvency law, simply could not be changed even by a court that disliked the law. With that strategy, even a Denning could scarcely have dissented. The case is treated mainly as a matter of statutory interpretation: what is meant by the expression "the whole estate of the debtor" in section 31 of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985? Since sequestration is collective diligence, the meaning of this phrase is itself rooted in the law of diligence.
21 Just as the same court felt able, in Sharp, to read another statutory expression, "property and undertaking", 22 narrowly, so in Burnett's Trustee it was able to read "the whole estate of the debtor" broadly. Indeed, not only could it do so, but it had little choice, because that expression, and its predecessors, 23 was (unlike "property and undertaking") an old one whose meaning was settled by old authorities. Indeed, in Burnett's Trustee the average date of the cases 24 Of course, the interpretation of the statutory expression was what was required by the parties to the litigation. But behind the established interpretation lies a system of property law which makes the traditional interpretation not accidental but necessary. Of that system one sees little in this case. But here one sees the strategy: counsel for the respondent no doubt did not wish to open up such fundamental issues in a court where a majority of the judges were English. And it seems that counsel for the appellant was equally unwilling to challenge settled principles. He refused to argue that there was a constructive trust, and one must applaud that honourable refusal. Had he been prepared so to argue, perhaps the court would have been divided, and one can only guess as to which side the majority would have been.
Was the result fair? The usual criticism is that the trustee took both the property and the price. 25 Is that not unfair? Of course it is unfair. It is horribly, grotesquely, unfair. But one does not get even to square one in the philosophy of insolvency unless one understands that insolvency is definitionally unfair. Inviolable rights must be violated. Outside insolvency, "it's unfair" is a trump card. Inside insolvency, "it's unfair" means little. Every claimant in insolvency is the victim of unfairness. To say that the result was unfair to the Graingers is at once true and irrelevant. We see their pain. We do not see the pain of the other claimants. We must recall that to favour one claimant is to increase the pain, perhaps already unbearable, of others, for the pot of assets is limited, and the more that goes to one, the less will go to others. 26 An insolvency law that sought to be fair to the individual claimant would be an unfair insolvency law. (Indeed, this is a perfect illustration of the dangers of judicial legislation: the court sees the person who suffers, and naturally wishes to use its power to offer balm. It cannot see in the round.) If there is a problem of fairness it is whether the buyers would be entitled to claim in the sequestration, a point to which Lord Rodger adverts. If they could not, that seems unfair, though of course even if they could, the result would be that they would receive only a percentage of the value of the claim. Much could be said. Here only one thought will be offered. If there is a valid claim, but if it is regarded as a claim arising after the opening of the bankruptcy, then that fact would in practice be likely to be favourable to the buyers, for a post-sequestration claim is not discharged by the discharge of the debtor.
The two English judges who gave reasoned speeches made it clear that they would have liked to allow the appeal, and thought that the seller held the property in trust for the buyers. 27 The Scottish judges rejected that view. But according to Lord Hope an express trust clause would have been effective. Lord Hoffmann said the same, adding: "It is a strange form of conclusiveness [of the Register] that can be so easily defeated." On this point, Lord Hoffmann is right. Public policy in Scotland has been, since 1617, that land rights must be registered if they are to have third-party effect. This is an aspect of the publicity principle. A latent trust of land drives a coach through the publicity principle. For that reason the law was, until 1893, that a latent trust of land was of no effect against creditors of the trustee. Gazette 41 at 43) Ken Swinton has written that "the legal system ought to provide a suitable method of protecting purchasers like the Graingers who are in good faith and for value." It does: registration. 26 Ironically, the pain of the Graingers was less than that of other victims, for the Graingers were entitled to compensation from their solicitors. The unfairness argument, were it relevant, would thus work against their claim, not in its favour. 27 In which country might that be the law? 28 (1893) 19 R (HL) 43. This case is often presented as having decided that property held in trust is unavailable to creditors. That is not so. That rule was an old one, but it did not apply to latent trusts of land. It was that rule which Heritable Reversionary Co changed.
Vol 8 2004 the edinburgh law review pointed out by Lord Hoffmann.
Trusts are good friends and dangerous enemies. They can be created by secret act, and yet can have dramatic third-party effects. Thus they contravene the publicity principle, a principle that has never taken root in England, but which has, at least since the seventeenth century, been an essential part of the public policy underlying private law in Scotland.
29 Indeed, since the seventeenth century there have been suggestions that trusts ought to be registered. One may conjecture that the reason why this has never been made a formal requirement of law is that in practice virtually all trusts are in fact publicly registered. Trusts of land normally appear in the Land Register. 30 More generally, inter vivos trusts are normally registered in the Books of Council and Session, whilst mortis causa trusts will appear in the Sheriff Court books as part of the confirmation process, and usually in the Books of Council and Session too. Double registration-both in the Books of Council and Session and in the Land Register-is quite usual. Such facts are familiar to solicitors but not always to others. Moreover, in normal trusts there will be the usual apparatus of quarterly meetings of the trustees, deeds of assumption and conveyance, sederunt books, authorised investments, annual accounts of charge and discharge and so on. The contrast is between the normal trust and the trust created to circumvent the policy of the law, without registration, without sederunt books, without accounts, without meetings of trustees, without everything. Trusts of the latter sort are normally created solely for the purpose of defeating the rights of lawful creditors.
31 As such they are, it may be argued, contrary to public policy. 32 But our legal system has yet to think through these issues fully. So whether a trust clause of the sort contemplated by Lords Hope and Hoffmann would be effectual is uncertain.
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Sharp is not overruled by Burnett's Trustee, but it is now confined to its own facts only. Lord Jauncey's attempt in that case to introduce an English idea of "beneficial interest" has failed. The exposition of the law given by the Inner House in Sharp, and especially the opinion of Lord President Hope, to whom the law in this area owes so much, is now re-established. 34 . The facts are set out in G L Gretton's case-note 2 which this note complements. Suffice it to state here that the solicitor of the purchasers (the Rev Harvey and Mrs Grainger) took as long as fourteen months to record their disposition from the seller, Mrs Burnett, and thereby allowed the permanent trustee in her sequestration to win the race to the register by recording his notice of title first. The House of Lords, affirming the Court of Session, unanimously held that the permanent trustee's title was to be preferred. Lord Hoffmann however thought that the decision left the Scots law of bankruptcy in an unsatisfactory condition for inter alia the following reason: 3 It results in the creditors of Mrs Burnett being unjustly enriched at the expense of the Rev and Mrs Grainger and I can see no compelling ground of logic or policy which justifies such a result.
[5] The unjust enrichment arises from the fact that the mistake of the Graingers in failing to record the disposition in their favour before the permanent trustee means that they are not only unable to assert title to the flat (a consequence which might have been reasonable if the contract had remained uncompleted) but that the permanent trustee is also entitled to keep the money they paid. To say this is a consequence of their own fault is in my opinion no answer. Mistake is generally regarded as a ground for relief against unjustified enrichment, not a reason why the victim should suffer the consequences of an error which has caused no prejudice to anyone else.
It seems that his Lordship would have liked to apply, or misapply, the law of unjustified enrichment in order to give a priority in bankruptcy to purchasers whose solicitors, either intentionally or by gross negligence, flout fundamental rules of good conveyancing practice. This note contends that Lord Hoffmann's argument is inconsistent with the Scots law of unjustified enrichment and in any event impolitic.
